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INTRODUCTION TO THE MORALITY OF LAW
By JOHN E. MURRAY, JR.t
THIS INTRODUCTION is designed for the reader who has not
read Professor Fuller's book. Absent a skeletal presentation of
the ideas in the book, the reader could experience great difficulty in
comprehending the papers which follow. Certain caveats are in order:
(1) There is no substitute for reading the book. This introduction
can only alert the reader to certain fundamental concepts found therein.
The rich use of analogy and simile should not be and is not duplicated.
(2) This effort attempts to report the basic concepts of the work as
objectively as possible. To this end, the language of the book itself
was used whenever possible. However, as Professor Fuller himself
would urge, any such effort must be a report not only of what the
book is, but, in some measure, what the reporter thinks it ought to be.
(3) Significant portions of the book are not mentioned in this intro-
duction because of space limitations. For this reason and the others
mentioned above, it would be unfair to evaluate the book on the
basis of this introduction.
CHAPTER I. THE Two MORALITIES
The principal motivation.for the book was the author's dissatis-
faction with existing literature concerning the relationship between law
and morality. Chapter I deals with one of the reasons for such dis-
satisfaction, to wit, a failure to clarify the meaning of morality itself.
There is a distinction between the morality of duty and the
morality of aspiration. The morality of duty lays down the basic rules
without which an ordered society is impossible. Essentially, its language
is that of the Ten Commandments, "Thou shalt not." It condemns men
for failing to respect the basic requirements of living in society. A
failure to fulfill one or more of these requirements would be wrong-
doing. On the other hand, the morality of aspiration is the morality of
excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers. A failure to
realize one or more of these powers would not be wrongdoing, it
would be shortcoming or a failure to actualize potential.
t B.S., 1955, LaSalle College; LL.B., 1958, Catholic University of America;
S.J.D., 1959, University of Wisconsin; Member of the Bar of the State of Wisconsin;
Professor of Law, Duquesne University.
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THE MORALITY OF LAW
The law cannot compel a man to fulfill his potential. The work-
able standards of judgment which the law must use can be found only
in the morality of duty. A man cannot be compelled to live the life
of reason. Only the more obvious manifestations of chance and
irrationality can be excluded from his life by the law so as to create
the necessary but not the sufficient conditions for a rational human
existence.
One significant manifestation of the distinction between the two
moralities can be found in our notion of rewards and punishments.
An individual is not praised or rewarded for fulfilling the requirements
of the morality of duty. Here, we are operating at the lower levels of
human achievement and an individual is punished for any failure
to fulfill these requirements. At the higher levels of human achieve-
ment, however, an individual is praised or rewarded for his accomplish-
ment. He is not punished for a failure to accomplish excellence. When
dealing with a violation of the morality of duty, the wrongdoing is
comparatively clear. Thus, the process of meting out punishments is
surrounded with objective tests often listed under the heading, "due
process." However, when dealing with the morality of aspiration,
many difficulties beset any individual or group charged with the
responsibility of determining excellence. The deciders must be care-
fully chosen. It is, perhaps, desirable if the deciders themselves have
manifested such excellence at some time because the judgment they
render is essentially subjective and intuitive. The closer a man comes
to the highest reaches of human achievement, the less competent others
become in their ability to judge his performance.
One may envision a moral scale which begins at the bottom with
the most obvious demands of social living. From this bottom point,
the scale ascends with more manifestations of the morality of duty.
However, at some point, the morality of duty ends and the higher
demands of the morality of aspiration begin. Where should the
dividing line be placed to indicate that duty leaves off and the challenge
of excellence begins? Controversy over the placement of this dividing
line has dominated the whole field of moral argument. The contro-
versy has been needlessly complicated by a confusion of thought. This
confusion is based upon the assumption that we cannot know what
is bad without knowing the perfectly good, that is, moral duties
cannot be discerned absent a comprehensive morality of aspiration.
This assumption is shown to be fallacious by elementary human ex-
perience. The injunction against killing does not suggest a picture of the
perfect life. Yes, we are very much aware that no conceivable morality
SUMMER 1965]
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of aspiration can be attained if men kill each other. Another example
is found in the field of linguistics. While the perfect language has not
been realized, we are not prevented from struggling against corruptions
of usage which destroy meaningful distinctions. Thus, with social
rules and institutions, we can know what is plainly unjust without com-
mitting ourselves to declare with finality what perfect justice is.
CHAPTER II. THE MORALITY THAT MAKES LAW POSSIBLE
This chapter begins with a lengthy allegory concerning the un-
happy monarch, Rex. The primary concern of Rex was to reform
the legal system of his kingdom which his predecessors had badly
neglected. Thus, Rex attempted in eight distinct ways to create and
maintain a system of legal rules. Each of these efforts contained a
serious defect which resulted in failure. There are eight correlative
kinds of legal excellence toward which a system of rules may strive:
(1) the requirement of generality, that is, there must be general rules;
(2) the promulgation of the rules; (3) the prospective application of
law; (4) the clarity of laws; (5) avoidance of contradictions in the
laws, that is, consistency in laws is necessary; (6) avoidance of laws
commanding the impossible; (7) the constancy of law through time,
that is, avoidance of too frequent changes in the law; (8) the con-
gruence between official action and declared rule, that is, prevention of
discrepancy between the law as declared and the law as actually ad-
ministered.
These eight principles of legality constitute the inner morality of
law, "the morality that makes law possible." They are standards of
excellence. They are arrived at not by reference to any external
standard of morality or the substantive aims of the law. Rather, since
law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance
of rules, the eight desiderata were distilled from a realistic considera-
tion of what is essential for this purposeful activity.
The inner morality of law is affirmative and creative in nature:
make the law known, make it coherent and clear, etc. But it is difficult
to realize these demands in terms of duty. For example, the notion
of subjecting clarity to quantitative measurement presents obvious
difficulties. Thus, with the exception of the second principle, promul-
gation (which does lend itself to formalization), the inner morality of
law is condemned to remain largely a morality of aspiration and not
of duty. Its primary appeal must be to a sense of trusteeship and to
the pride of the craftsman.
626
3
Murray: Introduction to the Morality of Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
THE MORALITY OF LAW
The eight desiderata are not absolute. An occasional departure
from one or more of them may be insignificant or, under some circum-
stances, even necessary.
CHAPTER III. THE CONCEPT OF LAW
To further clarify what has been said, this chapter seeks to
place the analysis of Chapter II into its proper relation with pre-
vailing legal theories.
Does the inner morality of law represent some variety of natural
law? "The answer is an emphatic though qualified, yes." The eight
principles which make up the inner morality of law set forth the natural
laws of that human undertaking which is the enterprise of subjecting
human conduct to the governance of rules. But they are not "higher"
laws; if anything, they are "lower" laws. They have nothing to say
about the substantive aims of legiglation which involve the external
morality of law. A convenient way of describing the distinction is to
refer to the inner morality of law as a procedural version of natural
law. Thinkers associated with the natural law tradition have treated
the inner morality of law (legal morality or legality) in a casual and
incidental fashion. They have been preoccupied with substantive
natural law, that is, with the proper ends to be achieved through legal
rules. They have tended to think of the principles of the inner morality
of law as obvious. But these principles can be most difficult to apply.
Thus, they must be brought together in an inclusive theory.
In relation to the treatment given legal morality by the positivists,
no clear pattern emerges. For example, Austin and Bentham seemed
much more concerned than Gray or Somlc, who demonstrate extreme
indifference toward the demands of legal morality.
There is one exception to the generalization that the principles
of legality have received casual and incidental treatment. This is
found in the literature of England during the sevententh century when
existing institutions underwent fundamental reappraisal. Herein lies
the "natural law foundations" of the American Constitution. The
literature was concerned almost entirely with the principles of the
inner morality of law - laws impossible to be obeyed, repugnancies,
etc. One example of this literature is Dr. Bonham's case, which is
often regarded as the quintessence of the substantive natural law point
of view. Yet, its heavy reliance upon procedures and institutional
practices is a significant manifestation of the inner morality of law.
The definition of law offered in this book is reiterated at this point:
SUMMER 1965]
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"Law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance
of rules." This view treats law as an activity and regards the legal
system as the product of a sustained purposive effort. Comparing this
notion with other definitions of positive law, one finds that it rejects
them. For example, when law is defined as the "existence of public
order," there is no indication of what kind of order is meant or how
it is brought about. When the distinguishing characteristic of law
is said to be "force," there is no recognition that the use or non-use
of force does not affect the essential problems of those who make and
administer the laws. Other theories which concentrate on the hierarchic
structure organizing and directing legal activity do not recognize that
the structure itself is the product of the activity it is thought to order.
CHAPTER IV. THE SUBSTANTIVE AIMS OF LAW
The two distinctions which have been insisted upon up to now
are the distinction between the moralities of duty and aspiration and
the distinction between the internal and external moralities of law. One
of the principal tasks of this chapter is to determine how the internal
and external moralities of law interact.
Over a wide range of issues, the law's internal morality is
indifferent toward the substantive aims of law and will serve a variety
of such aims with equal efficacy. However, this should not be taken
to mean that any substantive aim may be adopted absent a compromise
of legal morality. Many writers, typified by H. L. A. Hart, deny any
possible interaction between the internal and external moralities of
law. This is usually asserted without examples about which some
meaningful discussion might turn. Hart's typical view is that problems
of legal morality deserve no more than casual and passing considera-
tion. This chapter is concerned with restoring the intellectual channels
which should connect the problem of legality with other major issues
of legal philosophy.
Implicit in the second chapter of this work wherein the eight
principles of inner morality were suggested is the thought that the
internal morality of law is not something added to the power of law,
but is an essential condition of that power itself. Thus, law is a
precondition of good law. A conscientious carpenter might devote
himself to building a hang-out for thieves or an orphans' asylum. But
it takes a carpenter to build an orphans' asylum and it will be a better
asylum if he is a skilled craftsman with good tools. The insistence upon
the obvious proposition that some minimum adherence to legal morality
5
Murray: Introduction to the Morality of Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
THE MORALITY OF LAW
is essential for the practical efficacy of law is due to the fact that it is
so often passed over in contexts where it should be made explicit.
One deep affinity between legal morality (legality) and justice
has often been suggested even by writers such as H. L. A. Hart. The
quality shared by both concepts is that they act by known rule. The
internal morality of law demands that there be rules, that they be
made known and that they be observed in practice by those charged
with their administration. While these demands seem ethically neutral
so far as the external morality of law is concerned, just as law is a
precondition of good law, acting by known rule is a precondition for
any meaningful appraisal of the justice of law.
Another interaction between the internal and external moralities is
seen when the simple demand that rules of law be expressed in
intelligible terms is applied to a situation where the lawmaker cannot
plainly identify the target at which his law is directed. Obviously,
he will have difficulty in making his laws clear.
The most significant aspect of the interaction between the demands
of legal morality and the substantive aims of law is found in the view
of man implicit in the internal morality of law. While legal morality
can be neutral over a wide range of ethical issues, it cannot be
neutral in its view of man himself. If law is the enterprise of sub-
jecting human conduct to the governance of rules, this necessarily im-
plies that man is a responsible agent, capable of understanding and
following rules, and answerable for his defaults. The view typified
by B. F. Skinner's writings that man is not a free agent and there-
fore cannot be told to be good but only conditioned to be good is based
on an overreaching of science and a most naive epistemology.
In summation, an acceptance of the internal morality of law is
a necessary though insufficient condition for the realization of justice.
When an attempt is made to express blind hatreds through legal rules,
the internal morality of law is violated. Legal morality articulates
a view of man's nature that is indispensable to law and morality alike.
The suggestion made earlier that the internal morality of law
presented a kind of natural law was explained by the convenient termi-
nology, "procedural natural law." It was also suggested that, except
for promulgation, the principles of legal morality were condemned
to remain principles of the morality of aspiration. The final question
is whether we can derive from the morality of aspiration itself any
proposition of natural law that is substantive, rather than procedural
in quality. The one central indisputable element of natural law is
found in man's ability to communicate with his fellows. This is what
SUMMER 1965]
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has enabled man to emerge victoriously in competition with other
creatures. Man can acquire and transmit knowledge and deliberately
effect a coordination of effort with other human beings. Thus, the
one central indisputable principle of substantive natural law is: "Open
up, maintain and preserve the integrity of the channels of communi-
cation by which men convey to one another what they perceive, feel
and desire."'
1. FULLER, THs MORALITY o1 LAW, 186 (1964).
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